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This study analyzes the responses of performances of Bank
Mandiri, Bank Danamon, and Bank Permata to merger strategy.
This paper harnesses the quantitative approach with structural
break analysis method and impulse response function. The
plausible findings indicate that the merger of Bank Permata
produces a better performance response in comparison to the
consolidation of Bank Mandiri and the merger of Bank Danamon.
The merger of Bank Permata does not result in performance
shocks, and the structural break does not prevail either. On the
other hand, the consolidation of Bank Mandiri and the merger
of Bank Danamon result in structural breaks, particularly in the
spread performance. In order to return to the stable position, the
mergers of Bank Mandiri and Bank Danamon require a longer
time than does the merger of Bank Permata. This research
indicates that for large banks, the mergers and acquisitions
(retaining one existing bank) will deliver a better performance
response than will the consolidations (no existing bank).
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Introduction
Merger is one of the strategies to
expand a business, including a banking
business (Martin 1994: 293-295; Garton
et al. 2005), because by executing a
merger strategy the business could
decrease the average costs (Basanco
et al. 2004: 73-79) derived from either
the economies of scale or the econo-
mies of scope. In addition, in the event
of shocks, merger could also become a
survival strategy. Therefore, in several
countries, economic shocks have re-
sulted in a wave of mergers (Koetter
2005; Koskela and Stenbacka 2000;
Carletti et al. 2006).
However, in a managerial way, it
is not easy to execute mergers, acqui-
sitions, and other corporate actions.
There are several technical problems
which render mergers unable to yield
positive performances for the compa-
nies, either in the forms of efficiency,
innovation, or profitability. Several stud-
ies show that in the post-merger period,
companies will need an extensive phase
for rebuilding process such that the
positive performances expected from
the merger strategy can be realized.
During the rebuilding process, it is com-
mon to find merged companies that
fail. Fortune magazine observed in 1988
that of the mergers in the United States
in the mid of 1980s, one-half to two-
thirds had failed. That failure was mea-
sured based on the companies’ finan-
cial performances, meaning that the
merged companies showed poorer fi-
nancial performances compared to
those that did not merge or undergo
acquisitions. In this study, poorer per-
formances by the banking industry were
indicated by a decrease in the third-
party funds or deposits (Fulmer and
Gilkey 1988).
According to Fulmer and Gilkey,
there is a fundamental theory in human
capital that an employee will psycho-
logically suffer a shock as a result of
changes in the organization. Fulmer
and Gilkey argue that this human ele-
ment is rarely considered in the pre-
merger studies so that most merger
failures can be traced from human
resource problems. A study on 150
mergers and large acquisitions in the
United States during the mid 1980s
shows that almost 50 percent of senior
executives from acquired companies
will leave their organizations one year
after mergers and 75 percent of them
will leave their organizations within
three years after the mergers. This
finding indicates that in the post-merger
period, there are many complicated
managerial problems, preventing a
merger from immediately producing
positive performances. Moreover, mis-
management during the post-merger
period can also result in merger fail-
ures.
Managerial problems as the nega-
tive consequences of merger are not
only found in human resources sector;
more far-reaching, merger can also
create conflicts in the corporate cul-
ture (Weber and Camerer 2003). Us-
ing an experimental method, Weber
and Camerer analyze merger failures
associated with corporate culture. Their
study shows that decreases in perfor-
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mances are originated from difficult
circumstances resulted from the
changes in corporate culture. Accord-
ing to the analysis, the larger the corpo-
rations that merge, the larger is the
probability of conflicts. Consequently,
the probability of performance de-
creases after mergers will also be
greater.
In the case of a transnational
merger, post-merger managerial diffi-
culties should be greater. Steensma et
al. (2004) conducted a study on an
international venture capital company.
Their study finds that venture capital
companies or transnational mergers
are relatively unstable. There are two
important factors that cause the un-
stableness: (1) social exchange and (2)
learning perspective. In order to return
to a stable position, a unique time line is
required in each factor.
Based on this theory, it can be
assumed that in general, a specific time
line is required so that mergers can
result in good performances. Manage-
rially, this period is called the “rebuild-
ing after the merger,” and there is no
standard for how long it would take.
Each merger requires a unique time
line, depending on several components
such as human resources, culture, and
the organizations per se.
In the banking industry, the analy-
sis of the response of performance to
consolidation, merger and acquisition
strategies have been widely conducted.
Research have utilized various ap-
proaches which result in a variety of
conclusions. One of the studies was
conducted by Calomiris and
Pornrojnangkool (2005). The findings
show that merger and acquisition do
not necessarily improve efficiency,
measured by a decrease in average
costs. Taking the case of merger and
acquisition between Fleet and Boston
Bank in New England, Calomiris and
Pornrojnangkool conclude that in the
post-merger period, credit/loan market
in general becomes more monopolistic.
However, for small medium enter-
prises’ (SMEs) loans, there is a de-
crease in interest rate that might be
derived from the economies of scale.
Nevertheless, if seen from its cost
structure, it turns out that merger does
not significantly reduce average costs.
Another study which observes
banking mergers in Europe (Koeter
2005) demonstrates similar conclusions.
Using the stochastic frontier analysis,
Koeter concludes that the banking
mergers in Europe do not fully improve
efficiency. In fact, the difference be-
tween the cost efficiency of merged
banks and that of non-merged banks is
not significantly different. However,
when the performance is measured
using profitability, merger does increase
profits, especially for banks.
Similar studies were also done in
Malaysia. Using the method of non-
parametric data envelopment analysis,
Allen and Boobol-Betchelor (2005)
conclude that the wave of banking
mergers that occurred in Malaysia dur-
ing 1996-2002 do not necessarily im-
prove the efficiency of banking in gen-
eral. In the first year of mergers, banks
that merge have suffered from de-
creasing efficiency, and for subsequent
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years have shown no clear pattern of
performance responses toward the
mergers.
For the case of Indonesia, there
are several studies with different ap-
proaches. One study was conducted
by Mardanugraha (2005). Using the
parametric cost approach to analyze
the case of Bank Mandiri merger,
Mardanugraha concludes that the bank
merger in Indonesia has certainly de-
creased the efficiency level although it
has been able to increase the stability.
Another study was conducted by
Samosir (2003), who also researched
the merger of Bank Mandiri. Utilizing
the financial ratio approach, Samosir’s
conclusion is not very much different
from Mardanugraha’s, i.e., the merger
of Bank Mandiri has indeed reduced its
financial efficiency and performance.
Predicated upon the aforemen-
tioned discussion, it seems that merg-
ers do not immediately result in good
performances. Rather, an extensive
process is required. Mergers can even
fail because of managerial process.
This study purports to analyze the re-
sponse of performance to merger strat-
egy in Indonesian banking industry.
The structure of this paper is organized
as follows. Section 1 introduces the
ideas, section 2 reviews the banks
being studied, sections 3 and 4 are the
methodology and analysis, and section
5 concludes.
Overviews of Bank Mandiri,
Bank Danamon, and Bank
Permata Mergers
In 1997-1998, the Indonesian bank-
ing industry experienced a crisis which
was started by the closures of 16 pri-
vate commercial banks. This phenom-
enon made people panic, and triggered
an economic crisis. Afterwards, the
government commenced on a new stage
in developing Indonesian banking in-
dustry by taking several steps to re-
capitalize the banking industry. Those
steps include: (1) providing liquidity
assistance; (2) forming an Indonesian
Bank Restructuring Agency/Badan
Penyehatan Perbankan Indonesia
(BPPN), one of whose tasks is to take
over non-performing loans (NPL); and
(3) performing mergers of several
banks. The main objective of these
policies is to build a strong framework
for the banking industry such that the
industry can act as a powerful develop-
ment tool.
With the recapitalization programs,
the dynamics of Indonesian banking
industry in the post-crisis period (in the
end of 1990s and beginning of 2000s) is
increasingly characterized by banks’
mergers, consolidations, or acquisitions.
According to the industry terminology,
this phenomenon is deemed a wave of
mergers, considering the numbers of
mergers, consolidations, and acquisi-
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tions executed, as one of the efforts to
recapitalize the damaged banking in-
dustry caused by the 1997-1998 eco-
nomic crisis. In this period, there were
three phenomenal bank mergers, i.e.,
the merger of Bank Mandiri, the merger
of Bank Danamon, and the merger of
Bank Permata.
Bank Mandiri is a bank resulting
from the merger of four state banks,
i.e., Bank Dagang Negara, Bank Bumi
Daya, Bank Pembangunan Indonesia,
and Bank Ekspor Impor. Based on the
Government Regulation (Peraturan
Pemerintah) (PP) No. 28/1999, this
kind of incorporation is called a consoli-
dation, where the four banks were
dissolved and a new bank was formed.
The merger process of Bank Mandiri
began in October 1998 as a part of
banking restructuring programs. Al-
though the process had started since
1998, Bank Mandiri was not operating
until July 1999. The merger of Bank
Mandiri is an interesting merger since
it is a merger of four established banks.
Two other phenomenal mergers
after the economic crisis were the
merger of Bank Danamon and the
merger of Bank Permata. Bank
Danamon emerges a result of the
merger of 11 banks with two stages of
merger in which Bank Danamon is
retained as the existing bank. In the
first stage of merger which was car-
ried out in 1999, Bank Danamon ac-
quired Bank PDFCI. In the second
stage of merger in 2000, eight banks
were merged, i.e., Bank Tiara, Bank
Duta, Bank Rama, Bank Tamara, Bank
Nusa Nasional, Bank Pos Nusantara,
Bank Jaya Internasional, and Bank
Rasyid Salim. Thus, the current Bank
Danamon is the incorporation of 11
banks, which is Danamon plus PDFCI
and plus other eight banks in the second
stage of merger. Compared to other
mergers from the organizational side,
the merger of Bank Danamon is a large
merger although the individual banks
that merged are relatively small.
Quite different from Banks
Mandiri and Danamon, the merger of
Bank Permata is a merger of relatively
small banks, i.e., Bank Bali, Bank Uni-
versal, Bank Prima Express, Bank
Artamedia, and Bank Patriot. In the
merger process, Bank Bali was ap-
pointed as the platform bank since of
the five banks, Bank Bali was rela-
tively large and existent. Then, the four
banks were merged into the platform
bank, and the name of the five merged
banks was changed to be Bank
Permata. This merger was performed
as an implementation of the govern-
ment decision in September 2001. How-
ever, the actual merger was not carried
out until May 2002.
Those three bank mergers are
mergers based on the government
policy. All banks which merged were
takeover banks as they failed during
the crisis. Therefore, those mergers
are basically not a business strategy
performed voluntarily, but are arranged
by the government to enhance the
structure of the banking industry.
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In order to measure the response
of performance to merger strategy
observed in the consolidation of Bank
Mandiri, the merger of Bank Mandiri,
and the merger of Bank Permata, this
study employs an econometric method
by estimating the impulse response
function (IRF) model. The IRF ap-
proach is chosen because this method
delivers better results in measuring
responses compared to other methods
such as Taylor or Maclaurin series
(Cerra and Saxena 2008).
To estimate the IRF, this study
uses the indirect vector autoregressive
(VAR). IRF traces the responses of
dependent variable in the VAR system
to shocks from the error term in that
system (Gujarati 2003: 853-854; Enders
2004: 272-277). The models of struc-








: dummy; 1 if post-merger (acquisi-
tion), 0 if pre-merger (acquisition)

t
 : error term
Since X
t 
is a dummy, the estima-
tion in the SVAR models uses the
probit model as the dependent variable
as described in the following equations
(3) and (4).
From the SVAR models, in order
to detect the response of performance
to merger and acquisition strategies,








: 1 if post-merger (acquisition),
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According to theory, the associa-
tion between merger and performance
is a one-way relation, i.e., performance















































































The IRF model developed in this
study estimates the response of perfor-
mance to merger and acquisition strat-
egies. For this objective, several mea-
surements of performances are em-
ployed. Theoretically, the performance
measurement of a company (an indus-
try) can be analyzed using several
variables (Martin 1994; 14-38). First,
the number of produced outputs. Larger
outputs mean the company has better
performance since it indicates effi-
ciency from the economies of scale.
Second, the spread between output
selling price and input buying price.
Lower spread of the prices means
better performance. Third, the aver-
age costs. Lower average costs indi-
cate a higher efficiency which means
better performance. Fourth, profit. In
a perfectly competitive market, higher
profit depicts efficiency in cost minimi-
zation so that higher profit means bet-
ter performance.
On the basis of the theory, this
study uses Martin’s concepts and
Dymski’s approaches (2002) to mea-
suring performance by using these
measurements: (1) the size of disbursed
credits as the measurement of output
performance; (2) the spread between
time deposit rate and saving deposit
rate as the measurement of input and
output price deviation; (3) OEOI, the
ratio between the operational expenses
and the operational income as the mea-
surement of average costs; and (4)
profit before taxes. For the merger
variable, this study uses a dummy vari-
able which takes the value of 1 if it is
the post-merger or acquisition period,
and 0 otherwise.
Data Examination and the
Analysis of Structural Break
To employ the estimation, the pe-
riod taken is from quarter 1 of 1993 to
quarter 1 of 2009. This period selection
is based on the objective of this study,
which is to observe the effects of
merger on performance. Three impor-
tant mergers in Indonesia prevailed in
the period: the merger of Bank Mandiri
in 1999, the merger of Bank Danamon
in 2000, and the merger of Bank
Permata in 2002. Therefore, the period
taken must be before 1999 and after
2002.
Based on the sampling period and
the estimation method, this study uses
time series data. Statistically, time se-
ries data include four components, i.e.,
trend (T), seasonal (S), cyclical (C),
and irregular (I). With these compo-
nents, the time series data often have
an unstable pattern, so the average
value (mean) and variance are not
constant. In econometrics, the data to
be estimated must meet the require-
ments of constant mean and variance,





)2=. With these requirements, an
estimation using time series data must
satisfy the basic principle that the data
must be stationary or do not contain
unit roots. The consequence of not
meeting this principle is the emergence
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of a spurious or chaotic regression, and
the violation of classical assumptions.
Therefore, the initial step of the estima-
tion process in this study is to test the
data stationarity.
The testing of data stationarity has
developed for a long time. Dickey-
Fuller approach is the most popular
approach. Dickey-Fuller unit root test
is used on the condition of non-struc-
tural break. This test consists of Dickey-
Fuller test (DF Test) and Augmented
Dickey-Fuller test (ADF test). In their
developments, the DF and ADF tests
are considered too simple, and can lead
to a bias (wrong) statistical conclusion
because they do not accommodate the
structural changes in variables,
whereas, in fact, most of all economic
variables (especially macro variables)
contain structural break elements.
Structural changes, statistically, occur
when a stationary data series experi-
ences shifting in its average value
(mean) permanently (Enders 2004: 200-
202).
On the basis of a widely occurred
structural break, unit roots testing which
is able to capture structural changes is
developed. One test with this method
was developed by Perron and
Vogelsang (1992) and Perron (1997),
which is widely known as the Phillips-
Perron test or PP test (Enders 2004:
207). The null hypothesis of the PP test
is the data contain unit roots or are not
stationary, and its alternative hypoth-
esis is the data do not contain unit roots
or are stationary.
Another stationarity test which is
able to capture the structural changes
is a test developed by Kwiatkowski,
Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin or known by
the KPSS test. The null hypothesis of
the KPSS test is the data do not contain
unit roots or are stationary, and its
alternative hypothesis is the data con-
tain unit roots or are not stationary. The
Kwiatkowski model (Kwiatkowski, et
al.: 1992) is basically a refinement of
the DF and PP method. According to
Kwiatkowski, the methods that make
an initial assumption (null hypothesis)
of data contain unit roots are actually
based on a very weak argument. There-
fore, he argues that if the null hypoth-
esis of the DF or PP test is confirmed,
it must be supplemented by the rejec-
tion of the null hypothesis in the KPSS
test, which states that the data are
stationary.
The test of stationarity was then
improved by Zivot and Andrews in
their study on the impacts of oil price
shocks on the U.S. economy (Zivot
and Andrews 1992). In their paper,
they criticize the unit roots test with PP
and KPSS approaches since the tests
could produce incorrect statistical con-
clusions, especially when the variables
contain structural changes.
The study of Zivot and Andrews
actually complements and enhances
the study of PP and KPSS. In his
research, Perron is rather a priori, be-
cause he does not include variables
that capture informational of structural
changes specifically. In his analysis,
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Perron only reveals that the structural
changes in data are gathered from
previous information that has happened.
According to Zivot and Andrews, this
is a weakness that must be addressed.
To complement Perron’s analy-
sis, Zivot and Andrews include three
variables that can capture the struc-
tural changes: (1) dummy mean, (2)
dummy trend, and (3) mean or dummy
regime. In their model, Zivot and
Andrews label the variables as “shift in
mean,” “shift in trend,” and “shift in
regime.” The equations estimated to
capture the structural changes are as
follows.




 is a dummy mean
variable which serves to capture the
structural changes in intercept (á).
2. Shift in Trend (Structural Changes
in Trend)
in which  DT
t
 is a dummy trend
variable which serves to capture the
structural changes in trend (t).
3.   Shift in Regime (Structural Changes





  are dummy
regime variables which serve the
structural changes in intercept ()
and trend (t).
With this refinement, Zivot and
Andrews model is able to detect
whether in a certain period of time one
variable experiences structural breaks
without information of previous exist-
ing structural breaks.
Not only is Zivot and Andrews
approach able to test unit roots, but it
also could detect when a variable ex-
periences structural changes. Thus, an
extensive interpretation as to whether
a shock on a variable can lead to a
significant shock can be made. This
kind of interpretation is very important
economically, considering that in time
series data, the influences of irregular
elements have been less able to be
examined, or even to be detected.
Although Zivot and Andrews ap-
proach is the most advanced unit roots
test, this study is focused on the DF,
PP, and KPSS approaches to examin-
ing the data stationarity. This is based
on the consideration of the limitation of
program tools. However, Zivot and
Andrews approach is still performed,
not to test the data stationarity, but to
observe whether there are structural
changes (structural break) in bank per-
formance as a result of merger. This
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analysis is performed to complement
the IRF analysis on the mergers of
Bank Mandiri, Bank Danamon, and
Bank Permata. By doing this analysis,
the authors hope that this study can
contribute a more comprehensive in-
terpretation of merger strategy in Indo-
nesian banking industry.
Results and Analysis
The data stationarity testings us-
ing the DF, PP, and KPSS approaches
find that the data of performance vari-
ables for the three banks used in the
estimations are generally stationary in
level.
Structural Break Analysis
The observation of structural
breaks with the ZA test for each vari-
able in each bank can be seen in the
Table1.
The Table 1 shows that there was
a structural break from quarter 4 of
1997 to quarter 4 of 1998 in the time
series data of Bank Mandiri’s loans. If
associated with events occurring at
that time, it may be concluded that the
1997-1998 crisis has caused a struc-
tural break to the credit/loan variable of
Bank Mandiri. Meanwhile, the merger
phenomenon in July 1999 did not cause
a structural break to the loan variable
of Bank Mandiri. Two other variables
did not show any sign of structural
break during the observation period
(Q1 1993 until Q1 2009), implying that
the 1997-1998 crisis and the merger
phenomenon did not lead to a structural
break in both variables. On the other
hand, the spread variable experienced
several structural breaks from Q4 of
1999 to Q1 of 2002. It can be con-
cluded that the structural breaks are
the response to the merger phenom-
enon that occurred in July 1999 or Q3
of 1999. This means that the merger
phenomenon can cause structural
breaks to the performance variables of
Bank Mandiri, particularly the spread
variable.
Table 1. Structural Break Tests on Performance Variables of Bank Mandiri
Structural Break
Variable Mean Trend Regime
Loan Year of 1998 Q4 - Year of 1997 Q4
Year of 1998 Q4
OEOI - - -
Spread Year of 1999 Q4 to year of 2000 Q1 - Year of 1999 Q1 to 2000 Q2
Year of 2001 Q1
Year of 2002 Q4
Profit - - -
Source: Estimation results
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Similar to Bank Mandiri, Bank
Danamon’s performance variables also
experienced some structural breaks.
Details of the structural breaks periods
experienced by Bank Danamon during
the observation period can be seen in
Table 2.
Table 2 shows that the credit/loan
variable experienced a structural break
from quarter 3 of 1997 to quarter 1 of
1998. Meanwhile, two other variables,
i.e., OEOI and profit did not show any
sign of structural breaks during the
observation period. The spread vari-
able experienced a structural break
from quarter 1 to quarter 3 of 2000.
This indicates, similar to the case of
Bank Mandiri, that the spread variable
of Bank Danamon experiences a struc-
tural break as a response to the merger
event that occurred in 2000, while three
other variables do not respond the
merger event. From the data observa-
tion, the structural breaks to the loan
variable are more a response to the
crisis phenomenon than to the merger
phenomenon.
Table 2. Structural Break Tests on Performance Variables of Bank
Danamon
Structural Break
Variable Mean Trend Regime
Loan Year of 1997 Q3 to year of - Year of 1997 Q3 to year of
1998 Q1 1998 Q1
OEOI - - -
Spread Year of 2000 Q1 to Q2 - Year of 2000 Q2 to Q3
Profit - - -
Source: estimation result
Table 3: Structural Break Tests on Performance Variables of Bank Permata
Structural Break
Variable Mean Trend Regime
Loan Year of 1997 Q4 to Year of 1997 Q4 to Year of 1997 Q4 to
year of 1998 Q1  year of 1998 Q1 year of 1998 Q1
OEOI - - -
Spread - - Year of 1998 Q1 to Q3;
Year of 2001 Q4
Profit - - -
Source: estimation results
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Compared to the cases of Bank
Mandiri and Bank Danamon, the struc-
tural breaks prevalent in Bank Permata
show a quite different pattern, espe-
cially when associated with the merger
event of Bank Permata in early 2002.
The detailed observations of structural
breaks in Bank Permata can be seen in
Table 3.
Table 3 shows that the credit/loan
variable of Bank Permata experienced
structural breaks in the period of late
1997 to early 1998. Meanwhile, the
spread variable experienced structural
breaks from early 1997 to Q3 of 1998.
These structural breaks reappeared in
the end of 2001. The two other vari-
ables, i.e., OEOI and profit, did not
show any sign of structural breaks in
the period of observation. The findings
of structural breaks tests indicate that
the performance variables of Bank
Permata are not responsive to the
merger event of the bank in early 2002.
This may indicate that Bank Permata is
more sensitive to the shock of the
1997-1998 crisis than to the merger
phenomenon in the 2000s.
Impulse Response Function
(IRF) Analysis
The IRF analysis is basically in-
tended to observe the response of a
variable when a shock occurs. In this
study, merger is considered a shock to
a bank, and hence, performance vari-
ables will provide responses to the
merger shock. The IRF diagrams in the
subsequent part illustrate the responses
of performance variables when a
merger shock in the size of one stan-
dard deviation occurs.
IRF Estimation for Bank Mandiri
a. IRF of Credit Performance. IRF
estimation of the credit/loan perfor-
mance is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Response of Bank Mandiri’s Credit Performance to Merger
Shock
Response of CREDIT to Cholesky
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Figure 1 depicts that if there is one
standard deviation in merger shock,
Bank Mandiri’s credit performance
experiences a decrease in the initial
period. After five periods (five quar-
ters), credit shows a turning point and
increases. It can also be seen from
Figure 1 that as a result of one standard
deviation in merger shock, Bank
Mandiri needs an extensive phase of
approximately 80 periods or 20 years to
return to its stable condition as before
the merger.
When associated with the charac-
teristics of the banks merged into Bank
Mandiri, i.e., Bank Dagang Negara,
Bank Pembangunan Indonesia, Bank
Ekspor Impor, and Bank Bumi Daya,
the merger of Bank Mandiri is a merger
of existed banks with quite significant
strengths. Therefore, if there is a merger
shock, it will take an extensive time to
stabilize. This is consistent with the
organizational theories that the merger
of several large corporations requires a
longer time to rebuild after the merger
due to significant adjustment issues of
organizational culture and human re-
sources compared to the merger of
small companies.
b. IRF of OEOI Performance.  Some-
what different from the credit perfor-
mance, the OEOI variable in response
to the merger shock requires less time
to return to normal. The IRF estimation
results of Bank Mandiri’s OEOI per-
formance response to one standard
deviation in merger shock can be seen
in Figure 2. Figure 2 shows that in the
event of a one standard deviation in
merger shock, OEOI increases in the
initial period, which means there is
inefficiency, and after the merger con-
tinues for about two quarters (half a
year) the increase reaches its peak,
and then the OEOI decreases.
Figure 2.Response of Bank Mandiri’s OEOI Performance to Merger
Shock
Response of OEOI to Cholesky
One S.D. MERGER Innovation
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The decrease continues and then
reaches a stable condition after the
merger runs for about 26 quarters or
six-and-a-half years. From this obser-
vation, conclusion can be drawn that in
response to the merger, the OEOI’s
performance reaches the stable point
faster than does the credit variable.
If OEOI is used as an indicator of
bank efficiency, the response of Bank
Mandiri’s OEOI performance to the
merger provides a quite unique effi-
ciency indicator. During the post-
merger period, Bank Mandiri shows a
worsening efficiency response; the
OEOI strengthens (a positive reaction)
then declines, and after six quarters
(one-and-a-half years) of merger, the
OEOI shows a negative reaction. This
means that one-and-a-half years after
the merger, Bank Mandiri’s OEOI
undergoes an increase in efficiency
performance due to the negative re-
sponse of OEOI. OEOI reaches a
stable condition faster than does credit/
loan, indicating that the internal health
performance of Bank Mandiri is rela-
tively unaffected by the merger com-
pared to its external performance in the
form of credits.
c. IRF of Spread Performance. Sub-
sequently, it is found that the response
of spread performance to the merger
of Bank Mandiri corresponds with that
of credit/loan variable. The response
of spread performance variable to the
merger shock can be seen in Figure 3
in which the reaction of spread to one
standard deviation in merger shock is
shown. The spread increases in the
beginning, and it reaches its climax
after 10 quarters (two-and-a-half
years). It then decreases and reaches
a stable position after 75 quarters or
about 18 years. Unlike the OEOI, the
reaction of spread is always positive. If
Figure 3.Response of Bank Mandiri’s Spread Performance to Merger
Shock
Response of SPREAD to Cholesky
One S.D. MERGER Innovation
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spread is used as an indicator of effi-
ciency, then the merger of Bank
Mandiri decreases the efficiency until
it reaches a stable condition.
This fact is very different from the
case of OEOI performance, but rela-
tively similar to the credit/loan perfor-
mance. In the post-merger period, in
order to achieve a stable condition, the
credit variable will take approximately
20 years but is not responsive with
respect to spread reduction. Under
these circumstances, it can be con-
cluded that if there is one standard
deviation in merger shock, the credit
and spread variables of Bank Mandiri
will experience negative reactions until
they achieve a stable condition.
d. IRF of Profit Performance. The
response of Bank Mandiri’s profit per-
formance to merger shock shows a
similar pattern when compared with
OEOI variable. Figure 4 below shows
the reaction of Bank Mandiri’s profit
performance to one standard deviation
in merger shock. The profit variable
reacts negatively in the beginning to the
merger shock. However, unlike credit/
loan variable, this decline only lasts
shortly. After two quarters (half a
year), the decrease reaches its bottom
and the profit variable begins increas-
ing, and it achieves a positive point
after the merger runs for six quarters.
Furthermore, the profit movement
is always positive and achieves a stable
condition after 60 quarters (15 years).
Compared to the credit and spread
variables, the profit variable in response
to the merger shock only requires a
relatively short time to reach a stable
condition.
If profit and OEOI are used as
efficiency indicators of a bank’s inter-
Figure 4. Response of Bank Mandiri’s Profit Performance to Merger
Shock
Response of PROFIT to Cholesky
One S.D. MERGER Innovation
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nal health, then the similarity of profit’s
and OEOI’s responses to the merger
shock implies that the merger of Bank
Mandiri is responded positively by the
bank’s internal health. Meanwhile, if
credit and spread are used as the indi-
cators of external performance, the
merger of Bank Mandiri is responded
negatively until the bank reaches its
stability in the post-merger period.
Results of IRF Estimation for
Bank Danamon
a. IRF of Credit Performance. The
response of Bank Danamon’s perfor-
mance to merger shock is relatively
equivalent to that of Bank Mandiri. The
pattern can be seen in Figure 5, which
shows that if there is one standard
deviation in merger shock, Bank
Danamon’s credit/loan performance
will impoverish or have a negative
value in the initial period. After 10
quarters (two-and-a-half years), the
decline reaches its pit, and it then starts
improving. Nevertheless, this increase
never reaches a positive level, and it
reaches the stable condition only after
the merger runs for 76 quarters (19
years).
b. IRF of OEOI Performance. Dif-
ferent from the credit/loan perfor-
mance, the merger shock to Bank
Danamon is followed by a more dy-
namic response of OEOI performance.
Details of the response of OEOI per-
formance to one standard deviation in
merger shock are described in Figure
6, showing that in the beginning, the
OEOI increases and reaches its peak
after the merger runs for five quarters.
Afterwards, the OEOI declines and
reaches its bottom 12 quarters after the
merger. OEOI eventually reaches its
stable condition after 40 quarters (10
years) of merger.
Figure 5. Response of Bank Danamon’s Credit Performance to Merger
Shock
Response of CREDIT to Cholesky
One S.D. MERGER Innovation
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The pattern of OEOI indicates
that by using the OEOI indicator, the
merger of Bank Danamon delivers a
faster efficiency reaction compared to
using the credit indicator. If OEOI is
harnessed as an indicator of bank effi-
ciency and internal bank health, then
the merger of Bank Danamon yields a
good internal efficiency since OEOI
already shows a negative response to
the merger shock within the period of
six quarters (one-and-a-half years).
c. IRF of Spread Performance. Simi-
lar to the OEOI variable, the response
of spread performance to the shock
also has an expectedly good pattern.
Figure 7 shows the response of spread
performance variable to one standard
deviation in merger shock. In the be-
ginning, the response of spread to
merger shock is positive (inefficient),
but after two quarters (half a year) the
response sees a turning point. It never
reaches a negative level after arriving
at the stable condition when the merger
has run for 50 quarters (12.5 years).
d. IRF of Profit. Slightly different
from the case of Bank Mandiri, the
profit performance of Bank Danamon
never responds negatively to the merger
shock. Graphically, the response of
profit performance to the merger shock
for Bank Danamon can be seen in
Figure 8.
Since the beginning period, the
response of profit has always been
positive. After five quarters, the re-
sponse reaches the climax and then the
stable condition, which is after the
merger runs for 80 quarters (20 years).
Compared to that of Bank Mandiri, this
pattern is quite different as Bank
Danamon’s profit never produces a
negative reaction such as found in
Bank Mandiri.
Figure 6. Response of Bank Danamon’s OEOI Performance to Merger
Shock
Response of OEOI to Cholesky
One S.D. MERGER Innovation
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Figure 7. IRF of Bank Danamon’s Spread Performance to Merger Shock
Figure 8. IRF of Bank Danamon’s Profit Performance to Merger Shock
Response of PROFIT to Cholesky
One S.D. MERGER Innovation
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Response of SPREAD to Cholesky
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IRF Estimation Results for Bank
Permata
a. IRF of Credit Performance. The
detailed response of credit performance
to merger shock for Bank Permata is
depicted in Figure 9.
The response of Bank Permata’s
credit performance undergoes a dif-
ferent pattern from those of Bank
Mandiri and Bank Danamon. If Bank
Mandiri and Bank Danamon respond
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performances until the stable condi-
tion, the negative response of Bank
Permata’s credit performance is only
temporary, only for eight quarters (two
years). After two years, the credit
performance delivers a positive re-
sponse until reaching the stable condi-
tion in less than 15 years.
This pattern of credit performance
is quite interesting since Bank Permata
is a resulting merger of relatively small
banks compared to Bank Mandiri and
Bank Danamon. This pattern indicates
that the merger of small banks could
deliver positive credit performance rela-
tive to the merger of large banks. If
Figure 9. IRF of Bank Permata’s Credit Performance to Merger Shock
Response of CREDIT to Cholesky
One S.D. MERGER Innovation







Figure 10. IRF of Bank Permata’s OEOI Performance to Merger Shock
Response of OEOI to Cholesky
One S.D. MERGER Innovation
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discussed within the managerial theory
perspective, this is very possible as the
merger of small corporations in general
leads to less profound organizational
conflicts so that the merger will deliver
faster positive performance. In the
case of Bank Permata, it seems that
the consolidation after merger runs so
fast that the bank management can
immediately increase its credits/loans
aggressively.
b. IRF of OEOI Performance. In line
with the credit performance, the re-
sponse of Bank Permata’s OEOI per-
formance to the merger shock is nega-
tive. As seen in Figure 10, the response
of OEOI performance to one standard
deviation in merger shock is always
negative until it reaches the stable con-
dition. This indicates that the merger of
Bank Permata is reacted by a de-
crease in OEOI performance or an
efficient reaction. The stable condition
is attained within a relatively long pe-
riod of time, i.e., 20 years. Since the
OEOI’s response leads to an indication
of efficiency, the long duration is prob-
ably caused by the development of
managerial innovations that improve
efficiency.
c. IRF of Spread Performance. It
seems that the response of spread
performance to merger shock has the
same pattern as that of OEOI perfor-
mance. Figure 11 shows the response
of spread performance to one standard
deviation in merger shock for Bank
Permata. As can be seen in the figure,
the spread performance never reaches
a positive level until it obtains the stable
condition. In other words, an increase
in spread never happens in responding
the merger, implying that the merger of
Bank Permata has created spread ef-
ficiency. Somewhat different from the
OEOI, the spread performance only
requires a relatively short time, which
is more than 12.5 years, to reach the
Figure 11. IRF of Bank Permata’s Spread Performance to Merger Shock
Response of OEOI to Cholesky
One S.D. MERGER Innovation
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stable condition. With the response of
performance always leading to effi-
ciency direction, the length of time
required to achieve the stable condition
is expected to be much longer due to
management innovations that always
benefit or improve efficiency.
d. IRF of Profit Performance
The response of profit perfor-
mance to merger shock for Bank
Permata tends to provide an indicator
that is consistent with the responses of
other performances. The response of
profit performance to one standard
deviation in merger shock for this bank
is shown in Figure 12. As can be
observed in the figure, the profit vari-
able never responds negatively to the
merger shock. This is in accord with
the response of other performance
variables, where the credit/loan, OEOI,
and spread variables always deliver
the responses of efficiency.
Under these circumstances, it is
reasonable that the profit never gives a
negative response. Similar to OEOI,
the profit variable also requires an
extensive period to achieve the stable
condition, which is more than 20 years.
The conjecture is that it is caused by
the managerial innovation processes
that always improve efficiency.
Discussion
Based on the definition and con-
cept shown in the Government Regula-
tion No. 28/1999, the incorporation of
Bank Mandiri is called a consolidation
whereas the incorporations of Bank
Danamon and Bank Permata are con-
sidered mergers. The analysis of struc-
tural breaks shows that the three merged
banks, i.e., Bank Mandiri, Bank
Danamon, and Bank Permata, have a
vast array of patterns in responding the
external shock of 1997-1998 crisis and
Figure 12. IRF of Bank Permata’s Profit Performance to Merger Shock
Response of PROFIT to Cholesky
One S.D. MERGER Innovation
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the internal shock of mergers. The
crisis shock seems to bring a similar
shock that leads to structural breaks to
the credit/loan variable of the three
observed banks and to the OEOI vari-
able for Bank Permata.
Different from the crisis shock,
the merger shock does not lead to
unified structural breaks to all perfor-
mance variables of the three observed
banks. The merger shock only causes
structural breaks to the spread vari-
ables of Bank Mandiri and Bank
Danamon. The other three variables,
i.e., credit, OEOI, and profit, of the
three banks do not experience struc-
tural breaks as a result of merger shock
or crisis shock. Particularly for Bank
Permata, the merger shock does not
produce structural breaks to all ob-
served variables.
Based on the patterns of struc-
tural breaks occurrences, when spread
is used as the indicator of external
efficiency, then the mergers of Bank
Mandiri and Bank Danamon create a
shock to the external efficiency, lead-
ing to structural breaks. Meanwhile,
this phenomenon does not occur in the
merger of Bank Permata since there is
no structural break to all performance
variables as a response to the merger.
The IRF analysis seems to sub-
stantiate the findings obtained from the
structural break analysis. The IRF
analysis, in general, finds that Bank
Mandiri and Bank Danamon have a
similar pattern. In their responses to
the merger shock, the credit variables
of Bank Mandiri and Bank Danamon
decrease in the same direction, which
is a continuously negative response
until they reach stability. Meanwhile,
the response of Bank Permata’s credit
variable to the merger shock is nega-
tive in the beginning and turns positive
not long afterwards until it reaches
stability. The periods into stability also
differ; the credit stabilities for Bank
Mandiri and Bank Danamon are at-
tained 20 years after the merger shock,
while Bank Permata could achieve the
credit stability in less than 15 years.
The findings above indicate that
there is a compelling difference in the
pattern of the response of credit/loan
variable to the merger shock. If asso-
ciated with the character backgrounds
of the banks involved in the mergers,
there is an indication that the differ-
ences in characters of the banks result
in the differences in responses. Bank
Mandiri is the result of merger (con-
solidation) of four existent state banks,
Bank Danamon is a merger of 11
banks, whereas Bank Permata is the
result of a merger of five relatively
small banks. One of the bank supervi-
sory officials of Bank Indonesia, in an
interview, states that the dynamics of
mergers of large banks is much more
complicated than that of relatively small
banks. Therefore, one of the merger
objectives, i.e., to improve bank effi-
ciency, could be achieved, in general,
more quickly by the merger of small
banks. On this basis, Bank Mandiri and
Bank Danamon have a similar re-
sponse, which is a negative response of
credit variable and a longer stability
achievement compared to Bank
Permata. On the contrary, the credit
253
Lestari & Arsyad—The Response of Performance to Merger Strategy in Indonesian Banking Industry
variable of Bank Permata shows a
positive response, despite initially hav-
ing a negative response. In managerial
perspective, the merger of Bank
Permata is inclined to strengthen its
structure with less significant internal
problems. Therefore, its management
can immediately and aggressively make
loans, leading to stability in a much
quicker process.
The same thing happens to the
spread variable. For Bank Mandiri and
Bank Danamon, the spread variable
responds positively to the mergers, and
never responds negatively until it
reaches stability. The positive response
means that there is an increase in
spread in the post-merger period, and it
signals an indicator of inefficiency in
producing outputs (loans). This phe-
nomenon does not occur in Bank
Permata.
Another interesting finding is the
response of profit variable. The re-
sponse of profit for Bank Mandiri is
initially negative (decreasing income),
but after eight quarters (two years) it
becomes positive. This pattern of re-
sponse is slightly different from that for
Bank Danamon. The response of Bank
Danamon’s profit never reaches the
negative level, meaning that its reac-
tion to the merger shock is always in
the form of increasing profits.
If associated with the backgrounds
of mergers, it appears that there are
distinctions in the merger patterns of
Bank Mandiri and Bank Danamon.
The merger of Bank Mandiri is a con-
solidation; four banks are merged with
no trace of existence. On the other
hand, the unification of Bank Danamon
is basically a merger; Bank Danamon
still exists while the other banks are
merged into it. It seems that this dis-
tinction leads to the differences in profit
performance; merger generates prof-
its more quickly than does consolida-
tion. When these results are inter-
twined with organizational theory, it
seems reasonable that organizations
that get into the merger process are not
as strong as those involved in the con-
solidation process. Thus, merger has
indeed a better profit response.
For Bank Permata, the response
of spread variable to the merger yields
efficiency. Similarly, the responses of
other variables, i.e., OEOI and profit,
also show an indication of efficiency in
the post-merger period. Based on these
findings, we may conclude that the
merger of small banks is more likely to
obtain a response of efficiency than the
merger and consolidation among large
banks and the merger of many banks.
Conclusions
The structural break analysis
shows that the 1997-1998 crisis has
brought a shock to the three observed
banks, particularly to the credit perfor-
mance. However, mergers prevalent
after the crisis do not necessarily lead
to shocks to the entire three banks. The
merger of Bank Permata even does
not lead to shocks to all four perfor-
mance measurements observed. Based
on the observations on the three banks,
it can be concluded that the merger of
Bank Permata delivers a better perfor-
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mance response than do the consolida-
tion of Bank Mandiri and the merger of
Bank Danamon. The merger of Bank
Permata does not cause performance
shocks that lead to structural breaks,
whereas the consolidation of Bank
Mandiri and the merger of Bank
Danamon produce structural breaks,
especially in the spread performance.
There are differences in the re-
sponses of performances to merger
shocks for the three observed banks.
The differences are very likely due to
the differences in backgrounds and
characters of the banks involved in the
mergers. The IRF analysis shows that
in order to return to the stable condition,
the mergers of Bank Mandiri and Bank
Danamon need a longer time than the
time required by the merger of Bank
Permata. This implies that the merger
of small banks needs a relatively short
period to return to the stable position. In
addition, to be stable, the merger does
not suffer from decreasing perfor-
mance. In contrast, for large banks, the
process toward stability takes a longer
time and experiences a stage of perfor-
mance decreases. For the merger of
large banks, the mergers and acquisi-
tions (retaining one existing bank) will
deliver better performance responses
than will the consolidations (no existing
bank).
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